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STATE v. HICKMAN: AN ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO A THIRD
PARTY ATTORNEY-LADY LUCK OR LADY LIBERTY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, the United States Supreme Court answered the question of
what procedures safeguard a criminal suspect's rights before and during interro-
gation. Miranda v. Arizonal elevated an individual's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination to include an accused's right to counsel. At the expense of re-
versing otherwise valid criminal convictions, 2 the Warren Court3 implemented Mi-
randa as a stepping stone to constitutional liberty. However, the Court may not
have embraced Miranda's decisive role4 in a suspect's access to a third party at-
torney.5
In the years following the decision of Miranda, the trend of the Burger Court6
to retreat from the protections afforded by that case seemed to turn towards support
of Miranda.7 However, Miranda's increasing attacks from President Reagan's con-
servative bureaucracy have recently been heeded by the Supreme Court in the de-
cision of Moran v. Burbine,s while ignored by a majority of the states. 9
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Miranda held that prior to any questioning, an
individual taken into custody must be warned that (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law; (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney;
and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.
2 Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J.
405 (1982).
3 The Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren from 1952 until his
retirement in 1969.
4 Browning, Moran v. Burbine: The Magic of Miranda, 72 A.B.A.J. 59, 60 (Jan. 1986).
A third party attorney is one who has been retained or appointed by the defendant's family,
the court, or anyone other than the actual defendant.
6 The Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Warren Burger from 1969 until
1986.
Sonenshein, supra note 2, at 408.
1 Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). A defendant, arrested for burglary, was questioned
about a murder in another city. The police told a public defender, contacted by the defendant's sister,
that no questioning would occur. The defendant, without knowledge of retained counsel's availability,
executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and signed three statements confessing to the murder.
The trial court admitted the statements; the Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed his conviction;
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied habeas corpus; and the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and granted the writ, holding that no valid
waiver occurred. The United States Supreme Court reversed on certiorari, holding that the validity
of the waiver was unaffected by the failure of the police to inform the defendant of counsel, the
sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached, and police conduct did not violate fundamental
fairness granted by due process.
9 Id. at 1144-45.
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West Virginia, marshalling its judicial support behind the majority of states,
mandates that a defendant cannot waive his, fifth amendment right to counsel'0
when law enforcement officials have knowledge of an attorney's retention or ap-
pointment in his behalf and do not inform him. Decided three months before the
United States Supreme Court examined the issue, State v. Hickman" disallows
interference between an attorney and an individual at the questioning stage, despite
any exigency of the investigation.
While the defendant-minded may view the Hickman decision and its forerunners
as bracing the aching arm of Miranda's Lady Liberty, the United States Supreme
Court's view of the right to a third party attorney looks more like Lady Luck:
some defendants are blessed, and others are not. 2 In Moran, the United States
Supreme Court refused suppression of a prearraignment confession when police
failed to inform an accused of a third party attorney's efforts to reach him. Despite
pressure from many carefully reasoned state decisions, the Court believes that a
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" waiver can exist without a third party at-
torney's presence or apprisal. 13
Significantly, the Hickman decision places West Virginia among the majority
of states which include third party attorneys in the fifth amendment right to counsel.
This casenote will address the four differing views on expanding a defendant's
rights, how West Virginia placed itself among the majority view, and the important
distinctions between Hickman and the United States Supreme Court's opposing
decision, Moran.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Antoine Hickman's argument with a woman at a bar in Charleston, West
Virginia, culminated in a disturbance with other bar patrons outside the establish-
ment. A witness, who watched Hickman enter a yellow Cadillac driven by another
man, informed Charleston police. Two officers, in separate vehicles, searched for
Hickman. One spotted the yellow Cadillac and flashed his lights until the car pulled
over. The driver exited to talk to the police at the rear of his vehicle. After the
driver'stated that he had no part in the altercation that evening, but that Hickman
may have been involved, one officer approached the passenger door and asked
Hickman to get out. Hickman did not respond. The second officer then joined in
the request, whereupon Hickman pulled a gun and killed them.
1o The fifth amendment right to counsel was an extension of the right against self-incrimination
developed in Miranda.
1 State v. Hickman, 338 S.E.2d 188 fV. Va. 1985).
22 Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation?", When Does
it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 94 (1978-79).
"1 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 J.S. 458, 475, (1938)) (standard
to judge a valid fifth amendment waiver), "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation" of the rights
conveyed in the warnings "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id.
[Vol. 89
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss2/10
RIGHT TO THIRD PARTY ATTORNEY
Two arrest warrants against Hickman were issued the morning following the
shootings. Subsequently, a meeting was arranged between Hickman's parents, a
defense attorney, and the prosecuting attorney. Although the defense attorney never
informed the state officials that he was the defendant's attorney and testified that
he was hired by the defendant's family to assist the defendant in the preliminary
aspects of the case, he attended the meeting to assure Hickman's peaceful arrest. 14
One hour following the meeting, the police received a telephone call from a
man who stated that Hickman was with him and wanted to turn himself in to the
proper authorities. A detective drove to a prearranged meeting place, apprehended
Hickman, and returned with him to the courthouse. After informing the prosecution
of I-Eckman's apprehension, the detective read Hickman his rights in the presence
of a police officer. Hickman initialed each right and then signed the waiver form.
Following the waiver, the detective and the prosecution separately informed Hick-
man that his parents were in town. Hickman's response each time was that he did
not want any help from his parents. He was then formally arrested by the police
officer and again waived his Miranda rights in the same procedure as before. Fol-
lowing the second waiver, the prosecutor advised Hickman that his parents had
contacted an attorney; Hickman indicated that he did not want aid from anyone. 5
Hickman then confessed to the murders. He later repeated the confession. Mi-
randa rights were issued for a third time, and a detective obtained a stenographer
to record the statement. Hickman made a recorded confession and stated that,
although he did not want to involve his parents, he was not told about the at-
torney.' 6 When the attorney arrived at police headquarters, the confession was being
14 The testimony of the defense attorney was:
I never went to Mr. Roark or talked with him in my office when he was there and
specifically stated that I am representing Antoine Hickman in these two murder cases,
because I consider the murder case as trial preparation and the trial of the cases, and I
had not been retained by the family in that aspect of it. I was dealing with the preliminary
aspects of it, of getting him into custody, and, at least my thinking process was to include
the initial advice to the defendant once he was apprehended or had contacted me to give
himself up.
Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 191 n.2.
" The prosecutor's remarks at the suppression hearing:
[A]fter Ivan Lee had placed him under arrest and advised him of his rights, I advised
him, again, that I had met with his parents in a lawyer[s] office and that I didn't know
whether or not that lawyer would represent him, but I asked him if he wanted me to try
to contact that lawyer and have him present, and he indicated that he didn't want anybody
present.
Q. You mean he said the words, 'I don't want anybody here, I don't want to talk
to them.' He actually said the words?
A. He said, 'I don't want anybody here.'
Q. Those were the words he used?
A. That's right.
Id. at 192 n.3.
16 Id. at 192.
1987]
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typed for Hickman's signature. After conferring with the attorney privately, Hick-
man told the prosecutor that he would not sign the statement. The defense attorney
also asserted that he was not informed of Hickman's arrest by law enforcement
officials but heard it from other sources.' 7
The circuit court convicted Hickman on two counts of first degree murder and
sentenced him to two consecutive terms of life without mercy. On appeal, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment despite the defendant
raising three assignments of error. In arguing the inadmissibility of his confessions,
Hickman contended he was not informed of the third party attorney's retention
and was too intoxicated at the time of his confession to voluntarily waive his rights.
The defendant also asserted that he was not promptly presented before a magistrate
as required by section 62-1-5 of the West Virginia Code. 8 The supreme court de-
cided that Hickman had validly waived his fifth amendment right to counsel. Al-
though not specifically analyzed within this casenote, the court also held that
Hickman's intoxication had no bearing on the voluntariness of his waiver, nor did
it serve as a defense to premeditation. 9 On the issue of prompt presentment, the
court refused to render Hickman's confessions inadmissible when the state delayed
presenting him before a magistrate because they were trying to obtain a confession. 0
The confession was obtained prior to the court establishing this rule of law, and
retroactivity was denied.2'
III. PRIOR LAW
A. Miranda v. Arizona and Its Progeny
Beginning in the 1930s, police brutality and physical coercion developed into
the modern practice of psychological, custodial interrogation. Since the secrecy of
"incommunicado" interrogations crippled our knowledge of exact procedures used
by police, an examination of police manuals, texts from law enforcement agencies,
and documented procedure books evidenced the typical custodial interrogation"-
a "how-to" on creating an environment designed to break down a defendant's
resistance to confession.23 In response to the lonely defendant's interrogative outcries
came Miranda.
Id. at 193.
" W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1984).
" Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 200-02.
. State v. Persinger, 286 S.E.2d 261 (NV. Va. 1982) (Held: The delay in taking the defendant
to a magistrate may be a critical factor where it appears that the primary purpose of the delay was
to obtain a confession from the defendant).
21 Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 199-200.
- Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446-58.
Id. at 447, 450.
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In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court was adamant in its disapproval
of the purposes and methods of police interrogation in America.2 4 Conceptually,
it required a voluntary confession. 25 Theoretically, that confession must also be the
product of a "knowledgeable and intelligent" choice. Miranda's progeny consists
of various definitions of the waiver threshold, and some consistency results. In-
arguably, it is the defendant's stringent right to have an attorney present if he so
requests. 26 The Supreme Court warned:
The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney undermines his ability to
exercise a privilege-to remain silent if he chooses or to speak without any intim-
idation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel, in all cases before us, today
would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure
that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product
of compulsion.-
Miranda reasserted a standard outlined in Escobedo v. Illinois2 that, unless a valid
waiver occurs, or if interrogation continues in the absence of counsel and a state-
ment results, there is a heavy burden on the state to prove the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel.29 Although protections are evident when one requests an attorney,
rights differ when third parties are involved.
' Id. at 457.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other
than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its
own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally
destructive of human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at
odds with one of our nation's most cherished principles-that an individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defend-
ant can truly be the product of his free choice.
Id. at 457-58.
" Id. at 465. "Voluntariness is undermined by all interrogation practices which are likely to
exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free choice." Id. at 462
(citing Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, (1897)):
Voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced
by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact,
voluntarily made. A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to
police officers while in custody and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But
a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the character
of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or
otherwise.
Id.
, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
27 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.
11 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n.14 (1963).
21 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1976).
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In the years following Miranda, a series of cases dealt with determining the
exact moment that the rights attach. Courts jostled the meanings of "custody" and
"interrogation" until some congruency evolved. In 1969, a broadening of the ter-
ritory for an interrogation brought those occurring outside the police station under
the shelter of Miranda." Then, in 1980, custodial interrogation was labeled as "express
questioning or its functional equivalent,"'" clearly a switch from the original closed-
door, incommunicado scenario painted by the Court.
In response to those broadening definitions from 1969 to 1980, police officers
and law enforcement officials reacted by dispensing Miranda rights immediately
when a suspect was questioned. It was not until 1984 that a court found exception
to mandatory Miranda recitation in cases of public safety. 2
B. West Virginia Law
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Wye 3 dis-
tinguished the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel. The court emphasized
that Miranda required an accused to be advised of his right to have counsel present
during interrogation under the fifth amendment. The sixth amendment right to
counsel means a defendant is entitled to have the help of a lawyer at or after the
time judicial proceedings have been initiated against him "whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. ' 34
In discussing the weight given to the sixth amendment right to counsel, the
court found that, although there was no per se rule against waiver of that right,
waiver of the sixth amendment right is judged by stricter standards than waiver of
a fifth amendment right to counsel.3 To validly waive a sixth amendment right to
counsel, there must be a written waiver signed by the defendant; the defendant
must be aware he was under arrest and informed of the nature of the charge against
him; and the defendant must receive the customary Miranda warnings. 3 The fifth
amendment right to counsel waiver requires that a defendant be warned of his right
against self-incrimination and right to an attorney during interrogation. 37
Additionally, because these waivers are based upon fundamental constitutional
rights, courts will "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver ... and
will not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental right." 8 Since this
30 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
31 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
12 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (police officers can investigate suspects without
giving the Miranda warnings when the officers are prompted by a concern for public safety).
3 State v. Wyer, 320 S.E.2d 92 (W. Va. 1984).
3 Id. at 100-01. See also State v. Gravely, 299 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1982).
Id. at 103.
36 Id. at 105.
37 Id. at 100.
" State ex rel. Browning v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 181, 139 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1964) (Syl. pt. 2)(quoting
state ex rel. May v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177, 178 (1964) (Syl. pt. 3)).
[Vol. 89
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right is of such highly regarded constitutional dimensions, West Virginia has adopted
in State v. McNea139 that the burden to prove the validity of a waiver of a right
to counsel is upon the state, not the defendant.40 For the state to effectively prove
a valid waiver occurred, it must show that waiver of counsel was not only voluntary,
but also constitutes a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege. 41
IV. Four VIEws oN Timtn PARTY ArroRmYs
A. The New York Rule42
In a radical commitment to fuel the fires of criminal suspect protectionism
ignited by the Warren Court,43 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that once
the police know or have been apprised of the fact that the suspect is represented
by counsel, or any communication has been received for the purpose of representing
the accused, his right to counsel attaches." The New York rule is based on the
fifth and sixth amendments, prior case law, and the state constitution.45 The right
does not depend on an attorney's formal retainer" and may be activated for any
State v. McNeal, 162 W. Va. 550, 555, 251 S.E.2d 484, 487 (1978).
40 Id. (citing Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404).
[1]n determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law... it was
incumbent upon the state to prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. That standard has been
reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon a
request by the defendant. . . and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against
waiver... This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel,
whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings.
Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 (citations omitted).
41 Wyer, 320 S.E.2d at 103.
42 The New York rule originated in People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963); was further defined in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); and extended New York constitutional privileges in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). Because discussion of these three primary cases occurs
in reference to the New York rule, it is sometimes referred to as the Donovan-Arthur-Hobson rule.
Since Donovan was decided prior to the Miranda decision, most authorities prefer citing Arthur.
43 Kamisar, supra note 12, at 94-95.
- Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663. The defendant was arrested and
immediately confessed to throwing his two-year-old son into a river. He was placed in a police car,
brought to headquarters, and questioned. Upon hearing a television news broadcast about the incident,
an attorney, who had previously represented the defendant, went to the police station. He eventually
saw the defendant, who was visibly intoxicated and sick. He told the police to leave the man alone.
The following morning, in the absence of an attorney, incriminating statements were made and used
later to obtain a second degree murder conviction. Judgment was reversed because, once the attorney
notified the police of his involvement, no waiver would be validly made in his absence.
41 Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 84.
41 Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d at 328, 239 N.E.2d at 538, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
1987]
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suspect by any attorney. Also, it is unnecessary for the attorney to be physically
present to notify police of his involvement in a case.47
B. The Majority Rule
While New York requires that no waiver is valid without the presence of a
third party attorney, the majority of states profess a more subtle opinion.41 In
addition to receiving Miranda rights, a defendant who is held for custodial inter-
rogation must be informed of an attorney's retention or appointment. 49
The majority rule, as in New York, finds its philosophy in Miranda. While
Miranda provides that a suspect's rights can be waived, there is still a "heavy
burden" against proving the validity of that waiver.so The linchpin for both rules
is how the court interprets the three-prong waiver standard as announced in Johnson
v. Zerbst.1s For this line of cases, interpretation does not rest on a definition of
"voluntary" but depends on the scope used to define "knowledge and intelligence."
While a defendant may "generally" be able to knowingly and intelligently waive
his right to counsel, once a "specific" attorney becomes available for that "specific"
defendant, the majority suggests that knowledge of that attorney's accessibility is
imperative to effectuate a valid waiver. 2
The Delaware court has articulated a well-stated view of the majority opinion:
When a suspect does not know that an attorney, who has been retained or
properly designated to represent him, is actually present in the police station seeking
an opportunity to render legal assistance, and the police do not inform him of that
fact, there can be no intelligent and knowing waiver. The Miranda warnings indicate
to the suspect an abstract right to counsel, and the waiver of the right only means
that for the moment the suspect is foregoing the exercise of that conceptual privilege.
But that is clearly distinct from the opportunity to confer with a specifically retained
or designated attorney who is actually present, seeking to render legal assistance.
We cannot, and do not, conclude that a suspect, who is indifferent to the usual
abstract offer of counsel, recited as part of the warnings required by Miranda, will
disdain a chance to consult a lawyer waiting to see him then and there.
Proponents of the majority discount Miranda by labeling its offer of counsel as
an "abstract right of a conceptual privilege." ' 4 Their logic dictates that knowledge
People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 232, 205 N.E.2d 852, 855, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924, 928 (1965).
41 Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1151, n.10 (the American Bar Association's summarization of the ma-
jority of states' conclusions).
49 Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 194.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
' See note 13.
52 Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 685.
'4 State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980).
[Vol. 89
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necessary for waiver only occurs when that right becomes tangible or attainable to
a defendant.55
C. Two Minorities: "Rejection of the Majority" and "the Totality of
Cirumstances"
Several jurisdictions have refused to require the discovery of a third party at-
torney for voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving the fifth amendment
right to counsel.5 6 In Blanks v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court criticized the
New York rule and its variants: 7 "[wihatever its symbolic value, a rule that turns
on how soon a defense lawyer appears at the police station or how quickly he
'springs' to the telephone hardly seems a rational way of reconciling the interests
of the accused with those of society." 8 Thus, one minority of states visualizes a
problem with the sufficiency of Miranda, yet they would rather affirm a rule of
law which would be applied fairly to all defendants. According to the minority,
the majority rule benefits only those with the measures to obtain a third party
attorney; the New York rule blatantly favors "speedy counsel."5 9
The Supreme Court's Moran decision may have borrowed some likeness from
an even lesser minority: the totality of circumstances. Rather than give a definition
to what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent" waiver, this position prefers to test
the waiver upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, in-
cluding the background, experience, and the conduct of the accused.6 Moran af-
firmed the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation of Miranda, which places
" Id. at 278; Weber, 457 A.2d at 685.
' Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 330 S.E.2d 575 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1479 (1986);
State v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1981); State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982) (Burbine
was overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding); Burbine v. Moran, 573 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985),
rev'd 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
" Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 194. "Some courts incorrectly have characterized the majority view
we have adopted as a variation of the restrictive New York Rule, but we disagree." Id.
" Kamisar, supra note 12, at 95.
Blanks, 254 Ga. at 423, 330 S.E.2d at 579:
If Miranda warnings are insufficient to protect fifth amendment rights, this insufficiency
can be better addressed than by a rule which would only protect those with the money and
connections to 'bring a lawyer swiftly into the fray' and 'which would seem to favor the
professional criminal most of all.'
6 State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2245 (1986) (en banc)
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (quoting with approval, Johnson, 304 U.S.
at 458)). The defendant was not informed by police that an attorney was trying to contact him, yet
a valid waiver existed after examining the background, experience and conduct of the accused. He
told his mother to obtain counsel for him several days prior to his arrest. The court found this
indicative of the defendant's understanding of his right to counsel.
1987]
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the assertion of individual fifth amendment rights in the defendant's hands. 6' The
Court mandated a two-part test: while one prong of the Court's agreement is with
the first minority-knowledge necessary for waiver is not dependent on activities
occurring outside of the suspect's presence, prong two reiterates the totality of
circumstances test-the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. Only if the "totality of circumstances surrounding interrogation reveal
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court
properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. ' 6 2
Although the four views differ in result, each is trying to meet the difficult
challenge of dealing with third party attorneys. On a case-by-case basis, each court
has to deal with several parties: the defendant, the attorney, law enforcement of-
ficials, and a third party obtaining the attorney. Because the fact situations change
so diversely, it complicates implementation of a bright-line rule. Most often, the
problem occurs when the attorney's retention is withheld accidentally'or intention-
ally by police officials, and it is usually their role which is scrutinized by most
courts. 63
V. CA sE ANALYSIS
State v. Hickman is a case of first impression for the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals6 and an extension of prior law. In adopting the majority view-
point, the court found that withholding the availability of a "specific" attorney
not only results in an invalid waiver of Miranda rights, but also encourages de-
ception by law enforcement and attacks Miranda at its foundation. 61
A. Rejection and Criticisms of the New York Rule
By interpreting a culmination of holdings in State v. Wyer,6 the New York
rule was regarded as previously rejected. Wyer distinguished the sixth amendment
6, Burbine, 451 A.2d at 28:
[We are of the opinion that the principles of Miranda place the assertion of the right to
remain silent and the right to counsel upon the accused, and not upon benign third parties,
whether or not they happen to be attorneys.
Id.
Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 193-95.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 194-95.
Wyer, 320 S.E.2d 92.
[Vol. 89
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right to counsel,67 which arises at the commencement of adversarial proceedings,
from the fifth amendment right. 6 While Wyer 69 dealt with the sixth amendment
right to counsel, the court extended its holding to encompass the fifth amendment
waiver in Hickman on the basis that West Virginia grants no per se rule against
a waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Additionally, the waiver of a
sixth amendment right to counsel is judged by stricter standards than a waiver of
the fifth.70 For one to waive that sixth amendment right, he or she must receive
Miranda rights, be informed of the nature of the charge, and execute a written
waiver. 71 Since Wyer did not require the presence of an attorney to execute the
more stringent sixth amendment waiver, the court determined that Wyer rejected
the New York rule, which is based on the right to counsel under both the fifth
and sixth amendments.72
West Virginia not only rejects the New York rule, it declines to title its decision
as a variant of that rule. However, the court centered on the requirement of "vol-
untarily and intelligently" effectuating a waiver. Realizing the heavy burden of
proof that the state has in proving the validity of the waiver, the court focused
on Hickman's voluntary custody and execution of three written waivers of his
Miranda rights.71 Paramount to the written waivers, Hickman was apprised that
his family was in town and had contacted an attorney on his behalf. He rejected
the invitation to speak with counsel and, therefore, voluntarily and intelligently
waived his fifth amendment rights.74 Hickman's waiver, in substance, would have
67 Hickman, 338 S.E.2d at 195:
'Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after
the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment. [Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)].'
Id. (quoting Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398).
13 Wyer, 320 S.E.2d at 102 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. 470). The fifth amendment right to counsel
was created in Miranda as an adjunct to the defendant's right against self-incrimination. This fifth
amendment right to counsel is triggered when a defendant is taken into custody by law enforcement
officials.
61 Kenneth Wyer was brought before a magistrate following his arrest and requested that counsel
be appointed for him. The following day he confessed to first degree sexual assault. Since his sixth
amendment right to counsel attached when the defendant was arrested, brought before the magistrate,
and requested counsel, the court required an in camera hearing to determine if the defendant executed
a written waiver, if the defendant was aware that he was under arrest and apprised of the nature of
the charge, if he received his Miranda warnings, if he had shown a desire to have counsel, and whether
he had initiated further conversation with police evidencing his desire to waive his sixth amendment
tight.
7W Wyer, 320 S.E.2d at 104-05.
" Id. at 105.
72fHickman, 338 S.E.2d at 196.
Id. at 195-96.
74 Id. at 196.
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qualified as a sixth amendment waiver as well. Adjudged by the more liberal stand-
ards applied to a fifth amendment waiver, Hickman secured both requirements of
a written waiver and instruction on the nature of his arrest. 75
Hickman is in unison with the majority of states, but criticism of both the
majority and the New York rule may shadow ineffectiveness under equal protection.
Hickman's fifth amendment waiver survived judicial scrutiny because he was ap-
prised of a third party attorney's involvement.7 6 Hickman was among the privileged
few to whom the information was not withheld n While the New York rule is an
unconfined right to have an attorney present to institute a waiver once counsel is
available, in practice it may become a race to the police precinct by third party
attorneys :71
In the Gunner and Arthur cases, the New York Court of Appeals refused to
confine Donovan to its facts and emphasized the 'mechanical and arbitrary' nature
of a rule that would turn on 'the existence of a formal retainer' or whether an
attorney 'presents himself at the place where the suspect is in custody and expressly
requests the opportunity to consult with him.' Consequently, all an attorney needs
to do to invoke Donovan [the New York rule] is to apprise the police that he has
entered the proceeding?9
The New York rule has been criticized. The rule can be activated arbitrarily by a
family member retaining an attorney 0 or an attorney learning of the arrest of a
former client, with or without the defendant's knowledge or request.8 1 The rule
then favors suspects who have either the luck or ability, be it financial or otherwise,
to have "a specific" attorney immediately available. In an arena where equal pro-
tection inspired protection for the poor and uneducated,2 the New York rule may
well disaffirm equal protection for all criminal suspects. 3
75 Id., n.10.
76 Id.
" People v. Harris, 703 P.2d 667 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Weber, 457 A.2d 674; People v. Smith,
93 Iil. 2d 179, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Mathews, 408 So.
2d 1274 (La. 1982); Lodowske v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985), vacated, 106 S. Ct.
1452 (1986); Elfadl v. State, 61 Md. App. 132, 485 A.2d 275 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1457
(1986).
n Kamisar, supra note 12, at 95.
Id. at 94-95.
10 People v. Pinzan, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 462, 377 N.E.2d 721, 723, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269-70 (1978).
81 Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419.
8 Miranda was also decided under the fourteenth amendment and includes the right to have
an attorney appointed if one cannot afford an attorney.
" Kamisar, supra note 12, at 95:
There is not even a weak congruence-indeed, there is no congruence at all-between
a defense lawyer's entry into the proceeding and a suspect's need for a lawyer's help or
the government's need for evidence. Whatever its symbolic value, a rule that turns on how
soon a defense lawyer appears at the police station or how quickly he 'springs to the
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B. Criticisms of the Majority Rule: The United States Supreme Court in
Moran v. Burbine
The most well-founded criticism of the majority rule has been enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Moran v. Burbine.4 Although Moran weighed
the majority viewpoint, its rejection of that view also centered on the three di-
mensions covered by a valid waiver. By the Court's breakdown of a "voluntary,
knowing and intelligent waiver," it devised a rule of law. For a waiver to be "vol-
untary," "the relinquishment of the right must be... in the sense that it was a
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or de-
ception.""5 The Court also used the totality test.16
Applying this two-part test, the Supreme Court determined that knowledge
necessary for waiver is not dependent on activities occurring outside the presence
of the suspect. Although additional information may affect a suspect's decision to
confess, the Constitution does not guarantee a right to nonconfession. 87
Moran's placement among the minority position was in part premised on prac-
tical considerations.88 A point that Hickman, the majority, and the New York rule
do not discuss is the applicability of their rules. Although it has had its short-
comings, Miranda has been a clear-cut rule to apply. It undermines the specificity
of procedural safeguards to add an additional, undefined burden on police beyond
Miranda. As the Supreme Court points out, the two concerns balanced are "the
need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws"
and the control of an "interrogation process [which is] 'inherently coercive."'89
Protection of an individual from coercion is mandated. Miranda and its progeny
afford some protection, but now some realistic assessment of the importance of
investigatory efforts must be made. Must we dissuade confessions and end inves-
tigatory processes, or is the traditional allotment of Miranda warnings enough? The
suspect can end interrogation by not waiving his right to counsel under Miranda,
and the courts' concern of forcing police officials "to keep the suspect abreast of
the status of his legal representation" may be too much.9°
C. Hickman: A Nationally Supported Majority
The majority's broad adoption across the country causes one to reflect on the
Supreme Court's conclusion that a widely implemented decision is impractical. As
pointed out in the Moran dissent by Justice Stevens, "[o]urs is an 'accusatorial'
"Moran, 106 S. Ct. 1135.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1151 n.10.
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and not 'inquisitorial' system." 9' While our system is based on the accuser carrying
the burden of proof, it seems that "confession" is not a protected right or privilege
of the state. Furthermore, Hickman correctly interprets the historical role our system
plays in investigation by affording greater weight to the individual or suspect.
Countering this is society's substantial interest in apprehending, prosecuting, and
punishing criminals. After all, was Miranda not premised on the deep concern over
"incommunicado questioning"?
The third party attorney issue is not always as clear-cut factually as Hickman
depicts. Mr. Hickman was found to have been informed of his third party attorney.
The more difficult issue arises when deception is used by police. The United States
Supreme Court's position requires no disclosure of third party attorney contact,
whether it be accidental or intentional on the part of police officials.Y While "ac-
cidents" must be expected on occasion, the most deeply disturbing aspect of the
minority position is its implementation in instances where police deception is clear.4
Miranda, with all of its shortcomings, still provides a discernable legacy that
"the privilege against self-incrimination will only be honored in the official inter-
rogation setting where police and judges operate within clearly delineated guide-
lines." 95 If, as the minority suggests, blatant deception is forged with accidental
deception and unifiedly ignored, have we not reaffirmed Miranda's theme? "Abuse
of authority thrives on discretion."' 6
As suggested by the Hickman holding, rather than distinguishing cases on police
honesty, courts should focus centralize on the defendant's knowledge.
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Hickman aligns West Virginia with the majority of states by requiring
that information about third party attorneys be made available to a defendant.
Without this information, knowledge necessary to implement a valid fifth amend-
ment right to counsel waiver is missing.
Although the United States Supreme Court has decided differently, Hickman
and its predecessors meet constitutional muster, inasmuch as the states are only
required to give no less rights than those mandated by the Supreme Court. Hickman
stands among a strong majority of states and political forces who are concerned
that Miranda has simply become "magic language" which once invoked means a
91 Id. at 1148 (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.
Ct. 445 (1985)).
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.
- Moran, 105 S. Ct. 1135.
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defendant is protected. 97 In essence, proponents of the majority have updated the
incommunicado atmosphere, which inspired Miranda, and professed: "[y]ou can't
just take the defendant off the streets and keep him away from everybody." 93
States, including West Virginia, will now have to answer many questions arising
from the adoption of the majority view. When does a lawyer have a legitimate,
and ethical interest in the suspect? Has the interest been expressed properly? What
time restraints are required of an offer of counsel? Who in police enforcement is
responsible for the correctness and promptness of information given to a defendant? 99
Foreseeably, preceptive lawyering in West Virginia could depend upon how fast
an attorney is brought on the scene.1°° Although speculations about the decision's
implementation may look worrisome, at least some attempt is being made by the
majority to cross a river which Miranda has left bridgeless.
JoEllen Lyons
7 Browning, supra note 4, at 59. In Rhode Island's argument to the Unite d States Supreme
Court, thirteen lawyers for the Attorney General of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Office of
the Public Defender, joined by amici curiae briefs from the Department of Justice, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, the Legal Foundation
of America, the National District Attorneys Association and Attorney Generals from 30 states and
two United States territories, supported the "minority" position, while the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and the American Bar Association
supported the "majority" viewpoint.
" Browning, supra note 4 at 59.
9 Id.
11 Id. at 61.
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